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In 1900 US business corporations were dominated by plutocratic family owners, while 
British and French quoted companies more commonly divorced ownership from control.  
‘Democratic’ corporate governance rules explain some of Europe’s precocity and 
London’s exceptional listing requirement of large free floats was an important initial 
factor in manufacturing. Later in the twentieth century, the United States overtook 
France by further divorcing ownership from control. Business historians should direct 
their efforts to understanding why Britain was an early pioneer, with persistently wide 
shareholding, why America took decades to catch up, and why other countries did not 
build on their earlier lead. The pursuit of alternative (largely imagined) histories of 
national ownership differences could usefully be curtailed. 
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Introduction 
One of the stylized facts of twentieth-century business history is the increasing divorce of 
management control from shareholding ownership. Scholars have debated its extent and 
whether it has really fundamentally changed capitalism, though few have questioned that 
ownership did become increasingly divorced from control. Inevitably a concept so easily 
linked to ‘modernity’ has also been pressed into service as a tool for understanding the 
rise and decline of nations. Its enthusiastic embrace by Germany and the United States 
has been confidently identified as a prime source of their business and technological 
dynamism. By the same token, historians of France and Britain have gravely diagnosed 
the survival of family ownership and delayed management professionalization as a source 
of their economic retardation. 
Participants in the metropolitan capital markets of the early twentieth century 
would have found these perspectives somewhat puzzling, since they were aware that 
ownership was already substantially divorced from control in leading European 
businesses. They considered Paris and London the premier international stock markets, 
with New York and Berlin having more limited local roles. They would simply have been 
amused by any suggestion that listed share-ownership was more dispersed in America 
and Germany than in Britain and France. However, as avid readers of the newspaper 
sagas of personal capitalism of the Vanderbilts, Harrimans and Rockefellers, they were 
by no means certain that the distinctively plutocratic ownership structures favoured in the 
New World were doomed. It is easy for us to forget that, to the capital markets of 1900, 
Alfred du Pont was the well-known head of one of France’s largest quoted companies, 
while his distant namesake, running an American family partnership, was unknown.   4
Moreover, many businessmen at the turn of the century considered the divorce of 
ownership from control to be a potentially worrying problem requiring careful attention, 
rather than a solution to the political or management problems of capitalism that some 
political commentators and business historians later pronounced the supposedly new 
phenomenon to be.
1 This article explores why the perspectives instinctive to 
contemporaries differ so much from those of later writers, by examining where and why 
ownership was most divorced from control at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
 
Four Major Stock Markets in 1900 
On 2
 January1900, the main stock markets of the world opened for business with the 
equity capitalizations shown in Table 1.
2 These valuations are based on the previous 
weekend closing prices of ordinary (common) stocks and shares.





Stock Market Values of Domestic Corporate Equities quoted on Major National 
Exchanges at the beginning of 1900  
 
 Country (and                 Number of     Value of Domestic Equities         Sector Shares     
 Stock Exchange)           Companies             at Market Prices                                            
                                       with Listed     Total    Per Capita   Ratio to     Rail Finance Other         
                                           Equity                                          GDP                     
 
                                                                 ($M)         ($)             %            %      %     %                                      
                 
  
UK (London)                     783                4,300        104            49          49      17     34  
 
France (Paris)                     429               2,139          55            34           43      26     31 
 
US (New York)                  123               2,860          37            15           63        7     30 
 
Germany (Berlin)               719               1,110          20            14             9      45     47                                     
 
 
 Sources:   Cols. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7: Dimson, Marsh and Staunton, Triumph, pp. 23-6; anon, 
Documents, tables; cols. 3, 4: author’s calculations. 
 
aggregates in the table only include domestic companies officially listed on the 
appropriate national exchange. London – the capital of a country with around half the 
US’s GDP - was still, in absolute terms, larger than New York, even for domestic 
corporations alone. Paris - with a national GDP only one-third the US’s - was not much 
smaller, and, again, larger if quoted international equity were included. The puzzlingly 
small size of Berlin (comparisons of the final columns suggest) is partly explained by the 
relative insignificance of rail issues there, while a similar gap - financial issues - appears 
in the New York market. These ‘missing’ equities are, of course, largely the result of 
government actions. Germany had nationalized its major railways and their fixed interest   6
indebtedness therefore now appeared as government, not corporate securities. In the US, 
branching was substantially banned, so the thousands of American banks were mostly too 
small for a New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) quotation, while European banks were 
larger and often quoted.         
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 provide indicators of the penetration of 
corporate equity in the various economies, but should be interpreted with care. The 
column showing equities per head of population, for example, cannot be construed as an 
average holding within the country, since so many New York listed equities were then 
held in Europe. The average US citizen’s holding of NYSE-listed equities was certainly 
lower than this figure; while, given the prevalence of foreign corporate equity listed on 
London, the average UK citizen’s holding of London equity was certainly higher than the 
domestic total shown. Indeed, it is rather striking that at this time the value of all British 
investments in the United States alone – $2.6 billion, though that included unquoted 
investments, preferred stock and bonds – was about the same as the value of all the equity 
listed on the NYSE.
4 (Of course, neither of these two figures was a very large number 
when compared to the massive accumulated capital stock of the American economy, that 
had been financed by individuals, families, partnerships, other securities and other 
financial intermediaries.)
5 The ‘equity culture’ was not fully developed anywhere at this 
time, but shareholding was more widespread in Britain and France; Western Europe 
naturally had the more experienced and sophisticated investors.
6  
   Other things being equal, it seems likely that France and Britain would 
exhibit the larger degree of divorce of ownership from control that such large 
metropolitan stock exchanges facilitate. Shareholding habits were, of course, still   7
generally confined to the wealthier classes everywhere.
7 Yet, the typical share bargain 
size in London (around $500) compared with New York ($10,000) is consistent with 
somewhat wider share-ownership in Britain.
8 In France stock purchases as low as $100 
were acceptable to Paris brokers and banks.
9 American observers were amazed to find 
that in France small lots of shares traded for more than large lots (reflecting substantial 
excess demand from small investors), whereas in America the reverse was true (reflecting 
the adverse cost structure of small ‘odd-lot’ – below $10,000 – deals, in a US stock 
market dominated by plutocrats).
10 Where European and American shareholdings in the 
same company can be distinguished, American shareholdings were usually larger.
11 
Investment trusts, enabling smaller investors to spread their risks, were well established 
in Europe, but almost unknown in the US in 1900.
12    
Low minimum share sizes are also suggestive of a ‘democratic’ market. In Britain, 
there was no legal minimum and ₤1 (about $5) shares were quite normal, though France 
did not adopt the suggestion from an official enquiry that similar 25 franc shares should 
be legal for all companies there (shares of that size were permissible from 1893 only for 
small companies, with 500 francs ($100) being the minimum for large companies). In 
Germany, the minimum share size was fixed in 1884 at 1,000 marks ($250) to prevent 
small investors from taking risks on shares.
13 In the US almost all companies adopted a 
$100 norm, with only a few widely-held corporations like the Pennsylvania Railroad 
offering $50 common stocks.  
         Such observations are indicative, but not in themselves decisive, in establishing 
where share-ownership was most widespread. There are several possible reasons why 
such indicators might not reflect national breadth of stockholding. Some among these   8
countries might have relied more on non-voting fixed-interest bonds, that even more 
clearly divorced ownership from control than widespread equity ownership. It is also 
possible that the ‘domestic’ equity market size of the UK in Table 1 is exaggerated 
because British companies had most foreign direct investments (inevitably included in 
their domestic capitalizations).
14 Also, the metropolitan stock exchanges were those on 
which ownership was likely most widespread, but they were at this time supplemented by 
many regional exchanges and informal stock trading markets. These were probably of 
more importance in an imperial federation like Germany or a federal republic like the US 
than in (politically and financially) centralized Britain and France. The ‘free float’ of 
shares in listed companies that were in the hands of the general public may also have 
been larger in some countries than others: the shares closely held by the family directors 
who still dominated many of these companies – though normally included in the market 
valuation totals – could be correspondingly less important there. The evidence on these 
issues is far from perfect, and it is clear that ownership patterns differ by business sector, 
so the next sections examine these separately.  
 
Railways: Pioneering Management Control 
The railway sector was the largest component in Table 1, and Berle and Means, 
investigating the divorce of ownership and control in the United States, described it as the 
pioneer of the phenomenon there, so it is the obvious starting point. The first issue to be 
resolved is what to do about Germany, where most of the railway system had been 
nationalized. Berle and Means were inclined to treat publicly-owned US utilities as an 
advanced form of the divorce of ownership from control, implicitly seeing citizens as   9
owners, who did not directly exercise control.
15 Extending that treatment to the many 
railways (not to speak of gas, water and electric utilities, telephones, telegraphs, 
shipyards, tobacco factories and the like) that in 1900 were owned by local and central 
governments would tend to show European countries with more divorce of ownership 
from control than the US (which had one of the smallest government-owned sectors). On 
the other hand, not doing so biases the result in the opposite direction, since the industries 
that were often state-owned in Europe, like the railroads, led the move to wider share 
ownership in the US.  
  There is no obviously right answer to this conundrum, so I have simply opted for 
the latter bias: arbitrarily confining this study to the quoted company sector, however that 
was constituted. This also means that sectors with extensive family ownership – like 
retailing – are largely excluded. So, indeed, are entirely personally-owned firms like 
Krupp, Carnegie Steel and the Wills tobacco enterprise, to name the largest industrial 
firms in these countries that were not, at the end of the nineteenth century, quoted, though 
I will, from time to time, refer to such examples also. 
   The omission of regional stock exchanges is least serious in the case of railways: 
it is clear that most of the leading rail stocks were quoted on the major metropolitan stock 
exchanges. Dozens of European railways had, by the late nineteenth century, tens of 
thousands of shareholders each. In Britain, it was calculated that there were, in 1902, 
700,000-800,000 separate railway shareholdings, owned by 500,000 shareholders (1.2 per 
cent of the population). Neymarck reckoned the holders of railway shares and bonds 
together in France numbered 700,000 as early as 1895 (1.7 per cent of the population), 
though the shareholders alone would have accounted for barely half that. Data on   10
individual railroad companies also suggests widely dispersed shareholding. In Britain, the 
London & North Western Railway (LNWR: the largest company by equity capitalization) 
alone had 36,349 ordinary stockholders, the Midland Railway 46,661 and 8 others had 
more than 10,000 stockholders.
16 The situation was very similar in the six major French 
railway companies: the Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée (P-L-M) railway had 29,522 
shareholders in 1900. Only four P-L-M shareholders owned as many as 500 shares, worth, 
at 1900 values, only $135,000: so the largest 4 shareholders held less than 0.2 per cent of 
the shares.
17 
There were perhaps only 500,000 common stockholders in the United States in 
1900 (0.7 per cent of the population) in all enterprises: a lower proportion than for 
domestic railway stockholders alone in Britain.
18 American railways typically numbered 
their stockholders in thousands rather than the tens of thousands common in Europe. The 
known exceptions in 1900/01 were the Pennsylvania with 29,000, the Atchison, Topeka 
& Santa Fe with 13,147, the Union Pacific with 12,450 and the New York Central with 
10,320.
19 Many large railroads, however, were more personally controlled and had fewer 
stockholders: the Southern Pacific, the Erie, the Northern Pacific and the Southern were 
all so classified by Huebner. The average US railroad stockholding in his 1900 sample of 
large railroads was $21,890 (58 years’ earnings for an average US employee of the time), 
compared with $5,229 for the UK and $3,474 for France.
20 As American stockholders 
took over from Europeans in many American railroads in the 1890s, the average US 
railroad stockholding increased by 42 per cent, at a time when average railway 
stockholdings in Europe were getting smaller.
21   11
A key difference between European and American railroads was in their corporate 
governance rules. Generally the main providers of capital – the holders of bonds and 
preference shares – did not have significant voting power. However, in Europe even large 
ordinary shareholders were usually in a similar position, because of what Colleen 
Dunlavy has called ‘democratic’ rules of corporate governance: one vote per shareholder 
(rather than per share), or what Alexander Hamilton called the ‘prudent mean,’ that is 
reduced voting weight per share, as the number of shares held increased. This was the 
norm in the main railway companies and prevented, or at least strongly inhibited, the 
emergence of plutocratic control: large holders’ votes simply counted for less.
22 The 
boards of directors and professional managers in European railways were therefore very 
securely entrenched operators of what were essentially public service utilities: even the 
ordinary shareholders were virtual rentiers, not controlling owners. Occasionally sons 
followed fathers as railway directors, but only rarely do directors with the same surname 
serve concurrently on British or French railway boards: these were not family-owned 
companies, but public, widely-held firms controlled through elite business networks.
23 
There was little point in the directors on such boards having a large shareholding, 
unless it happened to suit their personal investment needs. In the LNWR, a director was 
required to own just ₤1,000 (nominal, about $5,000) of stock, though the actual holdings 
of the 23 directors at the turn of the century varied from that minimum, held by a recently 
elected Irish MP-director, through the chairman’s £2,440, up to the largest director 
stockholding of £65,000, the latter being the Duke of Sutherland, one of Britain’s 
wealthiest men. Collectively the 23 directors held only £225,422: well below 1 per cent 
of the stock outstanding in 1900.
24 The LNWR’s voting rules – which since an 1845 Act   12
had become standard in British railway companies – gave ten votes to any stockholder 
owning the director’s qualifying ₤1,000 block, but each further ₤500 up to ₤10,000 
commanded only one vote and, beyond that, there was only one vote per ₤1,000 of 
stock.
25 An outsider buying up a majority of the ₤42 million stock (which, at 1900 market 
prices, no one person in Britain - and only one or two in America - were rich enough to 
do) could only take control of the company with the support of numerous small 
shareholders, who had the overwhelming majority of votes. In practice, because the 
voting structure prevented a takeover bid coalescing small shareholders’ actions, the 
incumbent directors held effective control. Except when the board completely lost 
shareholder confidence, any significant holder was reduced to using ‘voice’ or ‘exit’ to 
influence board policy. 
   In France the voting power of railway shareholders was slightly different: in the 
P-L-M railway, for example, there was no vote for holders of less than 40 shares (worth 
about $10,800 on 1900), then one vote for every 40 shares, with an overall maximum of 
ten votes. This pattern – typical of many French companies – discouraged the nuisance of 
small shareholder attendance at annual meetings and was something of a charter for the 
comfortable bourgeois against the plutocrat: both less and more ‘democratic’ than the 
typical British structure. However, the practical effect was identical to that of the British 
voting structure: to entrench control by a self-selected and self-perpetuating board and the 
professional railway managers they co-opted, and to prevent any contestable market in 
corporate control developing. In both countries, railway boards consisted of bankers, 
politicians, merchants and industrialists – and the railway engineers and managers they 
promoted – who brought a range of professional expertise and varied stakeholder views   13
to their deliberations, and only rarely had significant ownership stakes. Edouard de 
Rothschild was on the board of the Compagnie du Nord, only tangentially as a result of 
the large financial interest his family had once had, but mainly because of his 
accumulated, expert knowledge of finance and administration.
26 
   In the US, by contrast, most railroad common stocks (or voting preferred stocks) 
had one vote irrespective of the number held: what Dunlavy terms a ‘plutocratic’ 
governance structure that is now the corporate norm. Hence, control could be obtained by 
a large shareholder, even – given high leverage and pyramiding – one owning a relatively 
small portion of total corporate capital.
27 In Britain or France, the difficulty of gaining 
control of large railway lines by buying a majority shareholding required that the 
consolidation by merger of complementary or competing lines be primarily a 
parliamentary and legal process.
28 In the US, though public policy also had a role, 
something like the modern takeover was the normal form of corporate consolidation and 
reorganization.
29 
Railway management at a US railroad like the Pennsylvania appears almost as 
securely entrenched as its French and British counterparts, given its unusually dispersed 
stockholding and large size. One well-informed observer commented that ‘The 
company’s finances have been conducted on principles more English than American.’
30 
New England railroads also tended to have more dispersed shareholding than western and 
southern ones. Yet many American railroads were under personal control. In the Southern 
Pacific, Collis P. Huntington owned 34 per cent of the stock when he died in 1900.
31 The 
pioneer developer of Florida, Henry B. Plant, owned practically all of the stock of the 
Savannah, Florida & Western Railroad, linking Tampa to Charleston.
32 George Gould,   14
the leisured and barely competent son of Jay, still ruled a rail empire, with 26 per cent of 
the stock of the Missouri Pacific (Gould family members had four of the 13 board seats) 
and ambitious expansion plans for extending their Rio Grande interests with the Western 
Pacific.
33 As Van Oss, the leading interpreter of American railroads to British investors, 
pointed out, the culture of American railroad management was quite distinctive: ‘it is 
much more autocratic than in Europe … Nearly all lines are governed by a clique or one 
single person. Occasionally the clique or individual own a majority of the shares; 
sometimes the majority of their shares is not absolute, but large enough to render 
opposition impossible.’
34  
Railroad politics around the turn of the century suggest a lively market for 
corporate control, with Harriman, Morgan, Vanderbilt, Gould, Hill and Rockefeller vying 
for personal control of further major lines. It was usually reckoned that, since fewer than 
three-quarters of votes were present or proxied at meetings, a holding of 30 per cent was 
sufficient to obtain control of a line, and contemporary stock exchange manuals routinely 
referred to such shareholdings as a ‘controlling interest.’ James Hill had only a 10-12 per 
cent interest in the Great Northern in 1900, though with the support of another 27 per 
cent of friendly stockholders represented on the board, like Morgan and Schiff, he 
reckoned to have control, and Hill family members occupied a third of the board 
positions.
35 He reckoned without Edward Harriman and the Union Pacific: their epic 
takeover battle for the Great Northern in 1901 indicated the critical importance, when 
control was contested, of having more than 50 per cent by the appropriate rules.
36 Hill 
eventually prevailed, but by 1906, Harriman controlled 25,000 miles of line outright, had   15
substantial holdings in 30,000 miles more and investments in 16,000 additional miles, 
giving him influence over one-third of US railroad mileage.
37  
   Thus although in European (and some American) railways shares were widely 
held and ownership and control were increasingly divorced, in the US, in the NYSE’s 
biggest equity sector, there remained stronger elements of personal ownership and control. 
Of course, in this cosmopolitan world, some European elements penetrated to America 
and vice versa. European bankers and bond trustees had sometimes been concerned by 
the instability of US railroad management caused by the fluid market in corporate control 
and, to counteract it, formed voting trusts, which temporarily (typically for five years, 
renewable) deprived shareholders of the vote. This gave them a governance structure 
more like that in Europe: the professional managers they installed had time to drive 
through technical and financial reconstructions. In the extensive railroad bankruptcies of 
the 1893 crisis, this became something of a Morgan speciality. The Erie Railroad, for 
example, was controlled by three voting trustees: J Pierpoint Morgan, Louis Fitzgerald 
and Sir Charles Tennant.
38  
Just as such trusts could replicate the effect of European voting rules in protecting 
a stable professional management team against marauding American corporate raiders, 
some companies in Europe became personally controlled in the American manner. In 
1901, the American Charles Yerkes and the Speyer investment bank formed a syndicate 
to take over and reorganize the Metropolitan District Railway (one of the London 
underground railways that, exceptionally, had a plutocratic voting structure) by buying a 
majority of stock in the market.
39 The tendency to personal ownership and takeover bids 
was, however, distinctly more pronounced in the United States, and, even after the First   16
World War, one American plutocrat could casually remark to another that he was 
thinking of buying a railroad.
40 That conversation could not then have taken place in 
Europe. 
 
The Finance and Utilities Sectors 
Railways often started large of necessity, but banks, insurance companies and other 
financial firms could start relatively small and grow organically, so partnerships and 
personally owned enterprises remained more common everywhere, and could attain 
substantial size without public issues. Large investment banks like Rothschilds and 
Morgans were still partnerships. However, in Europe and Japan by the end of the 
nineteenth century, a metropolitan stock exchange quotation was the norm for central 
banks (which, except in Tsarist Russia, were then investor-owned) as well as for many 
large commercial banks. These banks sometimes had similar ‘democratic’ shareholder 
governance rules to railways.
41 The central banks typically had thousands of shareholders, 
though their role in appointing directors was sometimes limited by government 
reservation of powers to appoint governors or a portion of the board. The Bank of 
England, in which stockholders with at least £500 of stock had one vote and no one had 
more than one vote, was the largest 1900 quoted company (equity capitalisation $238 
million) with a quite widely dispersed shareholding dating back two centuries.
42 In 1900 
it may have had around 10,000 stockholders (making the average holding worth $23,800), 
but only 191 of them owned more than £4,000 nominal of stock (then worth $66,000).
43 
The Banque de France had 27,136 shareholders in 1900, with an average holding of 6 ½   17
shares worth $4,767; the Reichsbank had 8,071 shareholders, with an average 
shareholding of 5 shares worth $1,920.
44  
European commercial banks’ shares were also widely held, particularly those that 
had expanded by acquiring other banks to build extensive branch networks. In France, the 
Crédit Foncier had 39,510 shareholders as early as 1900, their average holding of eight 
and a half shares being worth $1,208.
45 In 1885, there were four commercial banks in 
Britain with more than 5,000 shareholders; by 1902 four exceeded 10,000 and, by 1912, 
four had more than15,000 shareholders.
46 In most large retail banks, directors’ 
shareholdings were insignificant, despite the widespread (and by 1900 exceptional) 
survival of unpaid liabilities on bank shares, which might have been expected to deter 
small shareholders. The London, City & Midland Bank reached 14,200 shareholders by 
1908 and in 1911 – the first year for which comprehensive director shareholding data can 
readily be collated – had 17 directors with total holdings of only 3,938 shares or 1.2 per 
cent of those outstanding. The chairman and managing director since 1898, the self-made 
Sir Edwin Holden, held only 265 shares (£3,312 nominal paid-up value), and, as he built 
up the bank by sequential acquisition, he insisted that large shareholders in acquired local 
banks take cash rather than shares in payment, limiting the extent of other large 
shareholdings to well below 1 per cent.
47 An egalitarian who distrusted inherited wealth, 
Holden’s motive was to entrench professional banker control. 
   In contrast, family ownership of large stockholding blocks remained common in 
quoted American banks. The Stillman family, for example, owned 20 per cent of the 
common stock of the National City Bank of New York (president: James Stillman) and 
the Baker family owned 25 per cent of the common stock of The First National Bank of   18
New York (president: George Baker), with much of the rest concentrated in large, 
friendly hands, represented on the board.
48 In Britain’s large quoted banks, the top several 
dozen shareholders were needed to achieve a similar share of the capital. Even in 
canonical British cases, known for extreme levels of family ownership, like Barclays 
Bank (unquoted until 1902, with only 650 shareholders), the chairman’s holding was only 
6 per cent and it took the aggregate of many families’ holdings to equal these NYSE-
quoted bank board ownership levels. American family ownership was more than nominal. 
As late as 1919 - three years after its family-dominated board first installed an externally 
recruited, internally promoted, professional banker as Barclays chairman - the Stillmans 
declined to do the same for Frank Vanderlip, in order to secure their family succession.
49  
If personal control of the board was the norm in the largest US banks, whose 
stock traded in the nation’s financial centre, it is likely to have been encountered also in 
the more typical, small American community banks, quoted on regional stock markets or 
traded ‘over-the-counter.’ Even in New England, where, by 1895, boards of directors of 
Boston banks typically held as little as 10 per cent of the stock, much of which was held 
by other savings institutions and smaller holders, the development of takeover bids 
around the turn of the century led to some bank directors and New York financial 
interests buying up more of the stock to maintain or acquire control.
50 In Germany, a high 
proportion of millionaires were engaged in finance and personal ownership of banks 
appears to have remained common there too.
51 German data on corporate shareholdings 
in this period is exceptionally sparse as most shares were bearer shares, so shareholding 
data is verifiable only when disclosed for separate purposes. However, the directors’ 
qualifying shareholdings in Deutsche Bank and similar large quoted Grossbanken were   19
modest and shareholdings in such banks were possibly as dispersed as the major French 
and British banks.
52 
Large, controlling blocks were also found in US insurance. James Hazen Hyde, 
son of the founder of Equitable Life and its vice-president in 1900, owned 50.2 per cent 
of the shares.
53 The directors of the (US) Prudential also held a majority of its stock.
54 
There were similar family influences on European insurance companies, including 
Britain’s Prudential, but many had been established by broader shareholder affinity 
groups wishing to promote impartial professional insurance management. Such 
companies specified widely dispersed shareholding in their articles: Britain’s Legal & 
General, Caledonian, Provident Life, Norwich Union, Clerical, Medical & General and 
Equity& Law insurance companies, for example, limited the maximum individual 
shareholding to a low level, varying from 0.8 per cent to 2.5 per cent of the issued voting 
shares. In such companies, professional management control was contested, if at all, 
through means other than ownership. 
   European utilities and other service companies resembled banks, having widely 
dispersed shareholdings. Their tradition of professional management often went back 
many decades: London’s oldest corporate security in 1900 was probably the New River 
Company, a water utility dating back to 1619. Cable, gas, dock and water utilities were 
the largest in 1900, though the newer telephone and electric utilities were growing rapidly. 
Some of the large shipping and gas companies with public utility characteristics (like 
Britain’s P&O and Gas Light & Coke Company) had railway-style ‘democratic’ voting 
rules that encouraged wide share-ownership and professional management entrenchment. 
Yet other British shipping firms had ‘plutocratic’ voting and concentrated family   20
ownership.
55 The American banker, J. P. Morgan, felt at home acquiring some of these 
from plutocratic owners in 1901-1902, but was stumped by the widely-held Cunard.
56 In 
the United States, plutocratic family ownership was common, for example, in the Pacific 
Mail shipping line and some local utilities, where ownership stakes in neighbouring 
systems were built up by entrepreneurs wishing to promote economies of integration. 
 
Industrials: Bastions of Family Control 
In almost all countries, personally owned or family firms at the beginning of the 
twentieth century were still the norm rather than the exception in mining and 
manufacturing. In this sector, ‘plutocratic’ voting rules were standard everywhere and 
there was accordingly more convergence between the Old and New Worlds in ownership 
dispersion. The natural yardstick against which to measure deviations from these high 
norms of director control is the listing rule of the largest contemporary stock exchange, 
London. This required that in any public issue at least two-thirds of any security should 
be placed in the hands of the public: in other words, the ‘vendors’ (usually, at this time 
the founders or inheritors of the firm or group being floated) were allowed to retain 
ownership of a maximum of just one-third of any issue.
57 This longstanding London rule 
ensured that there was a sufficiently large free float to guarantee a liquid market for the 
shares and inhibit ‘corners’, and was particularly important in a market like London 
which welcomed small issues.
58 
The London ‘two-thirds’ rule was copied in Shanghai (where expatriate Britons 
founded the exchange), but does not seem to have been general.
59 The New York market 
had less need of such a formal, quantitative rule because its minimum issue size was   21
larger (the average size of New York listed companies was three times that on the leading 
European exchanges). Two exchanges known later to have similar explicit rules fixing 
the public’s proportion – the New York curb and the Brussels bourse – both adopted less 
stringent free float requirements: that only 25 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively, must 
be placed in the hands of the public.
60 Of course, all markets were concerned to have a 
large free float (that was their business), but their listing committees apparently adopted 
more ad hoc standards, which we have to deduce from individual cases.
61 It is clear, for 
example, that the NYSE routinely accepted smaller free floats. They listed the quarter of 
International Harvester stock that the controlling families were prepared to release in 
1908, but baulked at the even lower free float the Du Pont family sought around the same 
time. The Du Ponts, undaunted, resolved the matter by listing only their bonds and 
preferred stock on the NYSE in 1909, while the common stocks, with exclusive voting 
control, were traded on the curb and listed on the less fussy San Francisco Exchange. In 
fact, only a small proportion was traded, the controlling block remaining in the hands of 
the family and associates.
62  
   There is nothing particularly meritorious in the London rule, requiring an 
extremely high initial ‘free float’ of two-thirds of the stock (unless, of course, one is of 
the opinion that family majority ownership is, as Sellars and Yeatman would have put it, 
a very bad thing). Indeed, its objective of creating liquid trading conditions could 
logically have better been attained by the specification of a minimum aggregate value 
(rather than minimum proportion) of securities to be listed, an alternative that would only 
have obliged boards of smaller firms to surrender a voting majority. This alternative is, 
after all, the listing formula that most world bourses, including London, now adopt. Yet   22
the rule was, historically, of some significance: both because it influenced IPOs for many 
decades on the world’s largest stock market; and, coincidentally, it now offers a tool for 
the historian estimating the dimensions of the divorce of ownership from control in what 
is otherwise a statistical dark age.  
 Inspection of the files of the London listing committee suggests that the two-
thirds minimum was strictly interpreted and enforced.
63 Sir William Armstrong wanted to 
list his integrated steel and engineering business in 1889, but was turned down. The 
listing committee forced his agreement, two years’ later, to reduce the vendors’ share to 
the one-third maximum.
64 Many British limited companies had distributed shares 
privately among friends, relatives, managers, suppliers or customers before the IPO (and 
the listing committee considered these to be ‘vendors’ as much as the directors 
themselves), so the listing restriction meant that the proportion of shares retained by the 
board was, in practice, often as low as 25 per cent.
65 With a widely-dispersed public 
shareholding, 25 per cent was, of course, usually still sufficient for the board to retain de 
facto voting control, but this represented an unusually low degree of family control for 
industrial companies at this time in any country. Indeed, historians of the US routinely 
speak of higher levels of director shareholding (found in firms like General Electric) as 
typifying the amazingly advanced, contemporary American levels of the divorce of 
ownership from control.
66 There were, it is true, ways around the London ownership 
restriction that limited its impact. The simplest was to list in the US first: the listing 
committee accepted listing on a major foreign exchange, like New York, as sufficient, 
without further investigation. This permitted the London exchange to take a share of new 
issues or listings of American-registered corporations like International Harvester – a   23
valued part of its business – even though they preserved much stronger family ownership 
than the British rules prescribed.
67  
For British-based entrepreneurs, the favoured avoidance mechanism was similar 
to that followed by the Du Ponts: to create different classes of capital, to each of which 
the 33 per cent rule was applied independently. The directors could, for example, issue to 
the public only preference shares and/or debentures, with limited or no voting rights. In 
such cases, it was quite common for a family to retain absolute voting control with only 
one third of the securities: two-thirds could be issued to the public as bonds and 
preferences, with the family retaining all the ordinaries. (Such dual voting structures for 
shareholders had been outlawed for German AGs in 1884, but they were perfectly legal 
in most other jurisdictions and were to become so in Germany later; and, of course, 
German families were still free to retain control with minority ownership by issuing only 
non-voting bonds or by pyramiding). The British literature stresses this dual capital 
structure as the means by which business families retained control: it was, for example, 
the norm among brewing companies and all but a third of the largest British quoted 
breweries adopted it.
68 Using these techniques, breweries floating new issues in 1895-
1899 had issued only 49 per cent to the public, with the vendors retaining the majority of 
securities, and, in most cases, voting control.
69 Yet the equivalent breweries in America – 
including the largest, like Pabst in Milwaukee (whose family owners had rejected 
promoters’ advances from both New York and London) – were usually unquoted. No US 
breweries were listed on the NYSE in 1900, though some were quoted on London and 
regional American exchanges.    24
   Matters were very different among large British quoted companies in other 
industries: almost all these issued a two-thirds majority of voting ordinary shares to the 
public.
70 Their boards – the majority of Britain’s large quoted domestic industrials – were 
thus constrained to exercise only minority control. It was permissible for determined 
vendors to restore their share to above a third by buying back shares in the market after 
an IPO, but, given issue costs and normal post-flotation premiums, this would usually be 
at a considerable net capital loss and was, presumably, not a widespread practice.
71 
Another possibility was that, if acquisitions subsequent to the IPO brought in more board 
members with a share interest, the board ownership could go above a third again; but, as 
Franks, Mayer and Rossi have pointed out, the normal result of acquisitions in Britain 
was the opposite: to further dilute family control by widening shareholding.
72 Thus we 
can reasonably conclude that a substantial majority of large quoted British industrials by 
the early twentieth century had family or director shareholdings of no more than 33 per 
cent and many had less.  
A similar benchmark is not available for the US, because there was no similar free 
float rule on the NYSE. What is clear is that the number of United States industrials that 
can be confidently identified as having less than a 25-33 per cent board shareholding in 
1900 is rather small, but grew thereafter. I have been able to identify only one American 
non-railway stock – among around 50 for which stockholder data for 1900 are available – 
with more than 10,000 stockholders.
73 Curiously, this firm – American Sugar – is 
routinely described as being under Havemeyer family control, though in fact the family 
had secretly sold most of its dominating stock interest in the firm very soon after its 
formation in 1891. Henry Havemeyer nonetheless continued to run it like a family   25
fiefdom, employing his relatives, though, when he died, in 1907, his son was too young 
to secure the anticipated family ‘inheritance’ (if that is the correct term for nepotistic 
succession to something one does not own!). The presidency of American Sugar actually 
went to Washington B. Thomas, who held only 2.5 per cent of the common, enough to 
make him the largest stockholder: there were then 9,200 holders of its preferred and 
9,800 owners of common.
74 I have not been able positively to identify any other 
American manufacturing corporation in 1900 with a similarly widely dispersed 
stockholding, though at Pullman – as much a railroad operating stock as a manufacturer – 
board ownership had possibly fallen below 25 per cent.
75  
   Warshow’s sample of 1900 companies is chosen to illustrate the growing divorce 
of ownership from control in America, but few of them show more than the few thousand 
shareholders that were then routine among large UK industrials (the largest British 
manufacturer, Coats, though smaller than the largest US industrials, had more 
shareholders: 25,000 as early as 1896). British firms also often had wider stockholdings 
than American matched pairs. The Linotype Company Ltd, a British offshoot of the 
American printing machinery firm, separately quoted in London since 1891, had as many 
as 7,753 shareholders ten years later, more than all but three large American industrials in 
Warshow’s list.
76 Its NYSE-quoted American counterpart, Mergenthaler Linotype, with 
the Mills and Dodge families as major stockholders and directors, had only 2,000 
stockholders in 1901 and 2,770 in 1910.
77 Similarly, when BAT passed from control by 
Duke’s American Tobacco (whose board controlled 56 per cent of its common stock) to 
(mainly British) control on its London IPO in 1912, ordinary shareholder numbers 
immediately more than doubled relative to its former (NYSE-quoted) parent’s 1,200, as   26
board control was diluted to the required British IPO level.
78 Warshow’s 1900 sample by 
definition excludes the great US Steel merger of 1901, which created the first US 
industrial corporation to match the shareholder numbers of the most widely dispersed 
European firms. US Steel was massively larger than any European industrial (and thus 
had higher average shareholdings than typical in Europe) but it had similar (and soon 
even larger) stockholder numbers: initially 17,723 common stockholders and 25,296 
preferred stockholders; almost certainly its board’s shareholdings were, from its inception, 
below the British norm.
79 
   However, many other large NYSE-listed firms had board stockholding blocks 
well above the London limit. Procter & Gamble had issued little of its stock (listed in 
1890) to the public and refused to publish stockholder accounts, so that in 1903 the 
NYSE de-listed the company.
80 Other companies that abandoned accounts publication 
around the same time – like American Sugar and Anaconda – were not listed in the first 
place and traded only in the NYSE’s unlisted department. However, such reluctance to 
publish accounts was not abnormal in 1900 America: 43 per cent of the largest 100 
industrials did not do so, and thus could not be formally listed on the NYSE. Such a 
situation was inconceivable in the UK, Germany or France, where most large industrials 
routinely published accounts in 1900 and were listed on the appropriate metropolitan 
exchange.
81 Some large US industrials were still private partnerships or unquoted 
companies, but most non-NYSE firms were simply quoted on the curb, listed regionally 
or traded ‘over-the-counter.’ These often had tighter board control. Stock in Singer 
Manufacturing was one of the most difficult to get hold of on the curb, so was quoted 
with a very wide bid-ask spread.
82 The founders’ heirs, their families and the senior   27
managers held most of the shares. There were only 150 stockholders: as the New York 
Herald commented in December 1900, Singer was ‘even more of a closed corporation 
than Standard Oil.’
83 Although Standard was the world’s largest company by equity 
capitalization in 1900 – with a market value of $481 million (only a little below the total 
for all Berlin-listed industrials) – it, too, traded only on the curb. Its new 1899 stocks 
(replacing the old trust certificates) were held by about 3,500 stockholders, though the 91 
of these – mainly founding families - who were represented at the meeting to approve the 
new stock arrangement held more than two-thirds of the stock.
84 John D. Rockefeller – 
with 25 per cent – was Standard’s largest stockholder and president. Other members of 
the Rockefeller, Flagler and Harkness families, who had financed the original Standard 
Oil Company in Cleveland in 1870, together with nine other large stockholders and 
several manager-directors, constituted the rest of the board, which still held 39 per cent of 
the stock – again above the London norm - as late as 1911. 
Companies coming to a new NYSE listing in the early twentieth century often had 
stronger vestiges of family ownership than similar London-quoted firms. The 
McCormicks and other controlling families admitted only trusted Morgan and 
Rockefeller insiders to an 8 per cent stockholding on forming International Harvester in 
1902 and reserved only a quarter for gradual release to the general public (there was no 
formal IPO) when listed in 1908.
85 In the copper industry, the Rockefeller interests 
gained control of a majority of the stock of Anaconda in 1899 through their 
Amalgamated Copper vehicle.
86 The Guggenheims retained large portions of their 
publicly quoted metal mining and processing companies, like American Smelting and 
Refining and Nevada Consolidated, with continuing board domination, though not always   28
a majority of votes
87. The partners in Phelps Dodge – also engaged in consolidating the 
copper industry – moved toward incorporation and a listing in 1908, but the Dodge, 
James, McLean and Douglas families continued to dominate the board and held most 
shares (there were, in 1909, only 133 stockholders).
88 The partners in the Baldwin 
Locomotive Works incorporated in 1909 and listed on the NYSE in 1911, but the owning 
families continued to dominate the board.
89 
   Even for American companies that issued substantial amounts of voting stock to 
outside investors, the proportions sold to the public were typically below the London 
norm. Goldsmith’s analysis of the industrial and miscellaneous common stock issues on 
the NYSE and elsewhere, reported in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, suggests 
that for the years 1905-1914 the proportion sold to the public was only 34 per cent.
90 A 
widely-held firm like American Car & Foundry (no manufacturing firm except American 
Sugar had more than its 7,747 shareholders in 1900 in Warshow’s list), only issued to the 
public 50 per cent of its equity in 1899, below the London minimum for a free float. It is 
difficult to conclude otherwise than that the American firms of the early twentieth 
century that had ownership as widely dispersed as the typical large British industrial 
company were a small minority of large US firms. It was perfectly normal for the boards 
of large American industrials personally to own more than a third of the common stock 
and in many cases their holdings were higher. 
   In industrials, continental Europe was often nearer to America than to Britain, 
with more pervasive and persistent insider ownership by directors and their families of 
more than 33 per cent of publicly quoted companies, though there were exceptions. At 
Saint-Gobain, there were in 1900 only 4,600 shares, but the board collectively owned   29
only 260, or under 6 per cent of them.
91 The number of shareholders increased from 375 
in 1862 to 1,400 in 1907, but French historians point out that almost 80 per cent of 
directors between 1830 and 1930 were recruited from only ten families. (It rarely occurs 
to readers of such stark indicators of family nepotism that it might be hard to find a 
similar American corporation over the same period that was so open!) At Le Creusot, the 
Schneider family had started their reign with only 5 per cent of the shares, but had the 
backing of two substantial shareholders: these were still present on the board a century 
later. The De Wendel family concerns did not call on outside capital until 1908 and then 
raised it in Germany rather than France. The large coal mines of the Nord and Pas de 
Calais were in the nineteenth century under the control of a limited number of local 
families, though their shares were quoted on the Lille exchange and after 1900 became so 
widely held that it was said there were as many shareholders as coalminers, that is tens of 
thousands.
92 The Anzin, Béthune and Courrières companies were, however, still classed 
as owner-controlled, with Bruay and Lens more widely-held.
93  
   More generally, Leroy-Beaulieu warned French shareholders intending to go to 
company meetings that they would usually find the directors had a majority of the votes, 
so American-style plutocratic ownership, may also have been common in French 
industrials.
94 The widespread share ownership characterizing the French stock market 
was focused on railways, financials and the Suez Canal, and it was the contemplation of 
those sectors that caused contemporary Frenchmen to wax lyrical about the 
democratization of share-ownership.
95 Yet the market capitalization of Paris industrial 
equities in 1900 (see Table 1 above) was actually more than a third larger than that of 
Berlin, so (even allowing for stronger regional bourses in Germany) the traditional story   30
of the persistence of French family firms in industry, at least relative to Germany, may 
have been exaggerated in the telling.
96  
In Germany, industrial firms quoted on the Berlin Stock Exchange were also still 
majority-controlled by plutocratic families to a degree that would have fallen foul of 
stock exchange rules in the UK. Three quarters of the 502 German businessmen worth 
more than $1.44 million in 1911 ran privately-owned firms and partnerships or owned 
more than 50 per cent of the stock in a company.
97 Typical, except in its large size, was 
the Siemens electrical enterprise: majority-owned by the Siemens family. The new 9.5 
million mark share issue of 1900 preserved this: 53 per cent to the family and 47 per cent 
to the public. When Siemens took over Schuckert in 1903, care was taken to adopt a 
complex pyramid structure that still preserved the family majority, despite the large 
increase in outside capital required.
98 
Many German entrepreneurs may have remembered what Fritz Krupp had done to 
Hermann Gruson in 1892: Krupp, secure as the absolute owner of his own personal 
enterprise, turned up at the newly floated Gruson AG meeting, having bought the 
majority of that quoted company’s shares on the market, and simply kicked the former 
owner out.
99 In a small sample of German quoted companies issuing prospectuses in the 
1890s and 1900s, Franks et al report only 22-32 voters at the average shareholders’ 
meeting, though some of these would be banks or others voting as proxies for a wider 
range of individuals. However, the directors of these companies alone had 70 per cent of 
the votes in the 1890s sample and 61 per cent in the 1900s sample. The largest single 
shareholder in these companies – who surely would have sat on or at least been 
represented on the Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board) if not the Vorstand (management   31
board) – alone averaged more than a third of the votes, that would have been the normal 
British limit for the whole board.
100  
   There is also direct evidence of shareholdings above the London limit in many 
individual German industrials, apart from the obvious cases like Krupp and Thyssen 
which were entirely family-owned and unquoted. The Haniel family in 
Gutehoffnungshűtte, and the Hoesch and Stinnes families in their coal and steel 
enterprises, maintained effective family control
101 The Mannesmann family had lost 
control of its steel tube enterprise in 1893, but the Siemens and Langen families, with 
bank shareholder support, had board control.
102 In BASF, the Siegle and Knosp families 
of Stuttgart still held a controlling majority of the shares, until the 1925 merger diluted 
it.
103 However, in other German firms, entrepreneurs and managers with relatively 
modest personal shareholdings were also found: for example, Rathenau at AEG and 
Kirdorf at Gelsenkirchen. 
  
Calibrating National and Chronological Differences 
The two largest equity markets shown in Table 1 encompassed the contemporary 
extremes of substantial divorce of ownership from control (London) and persistent 
personal capitalism (New York). In the largest quoted sector in 1900, railways, share 
ownership was often widely dispersed, but board control through dominant shareholdings 
of a significant railroad remained normal in America and rare in Britain. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that directors controlled only around 2 per cent of a typical British 
railway’s votes, whereas the figure in the US was possibly nearer 25 per cent. Personal 
control was also more common in US banks: an average board share of 30 per cent of   32
stockholder votes in the US and 5 per cent in Britain is not implausible for quoted banks. 
Utilities figures are least good, but the mixed voting structure would suggest national 
levels and relativities very similar to those in the financial sector. Among large industrials, 
plutocratic family ownership (often with directors owning a majority of common stock) 
remained more common in America, where families retained control by methods such as 
voting trusts, limiting the free float, or issuing non-voting stock. The latter method was 
also permitted by British listing rules, so that the 33 per cent London limit was exceeded 
for directors’ votes in many such cases, but this was possibly outweighed by the large 
firms with more widespread shareholdings, so the benchmark of 33 per cent seems 
reasonable as a typical British level of board voting control in industrials in 1900. The 
range of examples we have found, and the paucity of cases below the London limit, 
suggests that a comparable representative figure for quoted American industrials at the 
same time was, plausibly, 50 per cent board ownership. 
Weighting these crude estimates of typical sectoral levels of board voting control 
in the US and UK, by the sector proportions quoted on leading national stock exchanges 
in Table 1, suggests a representative level of director voting control on their leading 
exchanges in 1900 of 13 per cent in the UK and of 33 per cent in the US. Making the 
appropriate additional allowance for the much higher US level of industrial and financial 
stock not officially listed on the NYSE – even without allowing for likely higher levels of 
director ownership in the smaller firms quoted on regional exchanges – would lead to a 
higher figure for the US; the corresponding British adjustment would be small (many UK 
regional exchanges followed the London two-thirds rule). On the other hand, no plausible 
modification of these guesstimates could produce a higher figure for the US than the UK:   33
we can have considerable confidence in the ranking, though the precise levels are subject 
to wide potential error. 
A similar exercise is also possible for France and Germany, but precision is even 
more inappropriate. France was similar to Britain in railways, finance and utilities and to 
America in industrials: applying the same weighting by sector would give a typical 
French level for 1900 of 17 per cent board ownership. Germany had few quoted railways, 
but it had a large financial sector which was more widely held than many American firms, 
so it may plausibly be reckoned as around the American level – that is, 33 per cent board 
ownership - overall. Combining these four countries’ figures, in the ratio of their relative 
equity capitalization totals in Table 1, suggests a typical level of board ownership on the 
four largest domestic equity markets of 1900 of around 22 per cent. 
These findings would not have surprised contemporaries. It might be objected that, 
if that were so, a European author would have written Berle and Means earlier. One 
explanation of this apparent lacuna is that contemporaries did not remark on the 
phenomenon because it was the (slowly evolving) norm in European companies, while 
pundits only write of rapid, noticeable changes: such as the remarkably fast retreat from 
personal capitalism in the 1920s USA that Berle and Means chronicled. Yet Europeans 
did notice the phenomenon. As early as 1877, Edwin Phillips bemoaned the inability of 
British shareholders to control ‘self-elective despots,’ that is, railway company 
managers.
104 Around the turn of the century pundits wondered – in terms anticipating 
Jensen in the 1980s rather than Berle and Means in the 1930s - whether the British 
penchant for professional managers with modest ownership interests was advancing too 
far, musing whether it might be better to ‘let the millionaires come in and take control, as   34
they have done in America.’
105 In France, Alfred Neymarck celebrated the 
democratization of share ownership in dozens of popular and scholarly articles.
106 After 
the turn of the century, references to the separation of ownership and control were the 
common currency of European economists and businessmen. Keynes’ 1924 lecture, The 
End of Laissez-Faire, did not claim originality when he expatiated on the difficulty of 
evaluating the consequences of the well-known phenomenon of the separation of 
ownership from control. Berle and Means were not internationally aware, but even they, 
when introducing the concept to a transatlantic audience newly experiencing the 
phenomenon, approvingly referenced its treatment in Walther Rathenau’s 1918 book Von 
Kommenden Dingen.
107 
 Why, then, do these findings shock some historians? The prevailing view is 
mainly based on the experience in manufacturing, where, as we have seen, the four 
countries were much closer together than in the rail, finance and utility sectors (then the 
dominant constituents of equity markets). It is easy to see, in areas like manufacturing, 
where the British had only a modest lead in divorcing ownership from control, how the 
erroneous belief that America led in promoting the phenomenon could take root. Alfred 
Chandler’s key error, for example, is not in diagnosing personal ownership on British 
industrial boards (there was a lot of it about), but in creatively imagining that it was not 
more prevalent in the contemporary US and Germany.
108 Many historians of Britain – the 
recent critiques of ‘declinism’ have plausibly alleged – are programmed to discern the 
causes of decline in everything, and, since the divorce of ownership from control 
appeared to go along with modernity and professionalism, it was an obvious candidate for 
the usual treatment.
109 Also more frequently noted now is the Panglossian, Whig   35
perspective of much work on American business history.
110 Although this is the polar 
opposite of the British deformation, it mirrors its distortions. Relentlessly emphasizing 
the US’s modernity and success, a well-trained exponent betrays not the slightest 
glimmer of definitional hesitation when pronouncing fourth-generation family inheritors 
of 90 per cent of a stock corporation to be 100 per cent, all-American, ‘professional 
managers.’ This is not serious historical analysis. 
The many equities of companies excluded from Table 1 – quoted in 1900 on 
smaller world bourses or quoted on London, Paris and Berlin, but mainly operating 
abroad – also require consideration. In the rest of Europe, it was quite common for 
companies to adopt variants of the Anglo-French voting model and we know that on 
some stock exchanges, like Brussels, stock-ownership was even more widespread than in 
France.
111 The Rothschild and Gomperz influence on Viennese banking was proverbially 
strong, but the Rothschilds, the largest shareholders in Credit Anstalt before the First 
World War, had barely 10 per cent of the votes.
112 It might be thought that enterprises 
operating in the less advanced, extra-European economies would tend to be more 
personally owned, but such evidence as we have suggests that they did not emulate the 
distinctive contemporary American model of personal capitalism. In Japan, for example, 
while enterprises like Mitsui were still unquoted partnerships, in sectors like cotton, 
banks and railways, where companies were quoted in 1900, they were quite widely held: 
Japan’s more concentrated quoted shareholding structures were a later development.
113 
Egypt’s largest company, Suez, was quoted on many European exchanges, widely held 
and had French-style voting rules entrenching its professional managers.
114 India’s largest 
company, the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, and other railways in the developing   36
world financed from London, Paris and elsewhere in Europe, the voting structure 
followed the Anglo-French ‘democratic’ rather than American ‘plutocratic’ model. The 
large numbers of overseas banks quoted on London and Paris, like the Hongkong & 
Shanghai Banking Corporation, typically had extensive shareholdings, and sometimes 
‘democratic’ voting structures.
115 Accordingly, ownership in such ‘Third World’ 
companies was likely as widely divorced from control as in France and Britain. 
In the British South Africa Company’s London IPO of 1892 – essentially a start-
up – the concessionaires received less than 10 per cent of the shares, with the rest being 
issued (for cash) to 8,000 new public shareholders.
116 One sample of 260 British share 
registers suggests that foreign and colonial companies actually had slightly more 
shareholders than domestic ones, on average; they were also somewhat larger; and they 
rarely included manufacturing firms (in which family ownership was everywhere more 
common).
117 There were exceptions to this pattern: the Sassoon family’s dominant 30 per 
cent shareholding in the Imperial Bank of Persia was nearer to the American than the 
British banking model, while the Samuel family retained tight voting control of Shell 
Transport & Trading, the London-quoted oil company with largely overseas 
operations.
118 Nonetheless, the balance of evidence suggests that, if any modification is to 
be made to the estimate of the global 1900 degree of ownership and control, based on the 
four large countries in Table 1, it is as likely to be in a downwards as an upward direction. 
It is America’s high level of personal ownership and low free floats that is distinctive. 
Slowly, but surely, America’s leading industrial firms did list on New York: 
Carnegie Steel (reborn as the core of US Steel) in 1901, Standard Oil in 1920, Procter & 
Gamble in 1929, Gulf Oil in 1943, Alcoa in 1951. Shareholdings in listed firms also   37
became more dispersed, as directing families trickled out their stocks to the public. Berle 
and Means really could, by the 1930s, celebrate America’s having caught up with Britain 
and overtaken continental Europe in the divorce of ownership from control: by then, in 
the typical American quoted company, the managers owned only 13 per cent of the 
equity, a figure identical to my crude London estimate for 1900.
119 At the same time as 
the grip of American owning families faltered, the rise in progressive taxation after 1916 
increased the relative attraction of stock ownership to non-plutocrats and the 1920s stock 
boom popularized the equity culture.
120 Morgan’s dealings with a few elite institutions 
and wealthy individuals were supplemented by extensive small investor participation.
121 
In 1900 it is hard to trace more than a half dozen US companies that numbered their 
stockholders in above four figures (but easy to do so in Europe). By the 1930s, several 
corporations (in America as in Europe) had six-figure totals, and AT&T, with 642,180 
stockholders in 1931, was the world’s most widely held stock.
122 
America’s enthusiastic and decisive acceptance of such changes suggests that they 
were not without positive consequences. The pace of change in the US in the decades 
following the turn of the century was much faster than that in Europe. That many 
continental Europeans at the same time turned away from stock markets was not so much 
due to their markets’ own shortcomings, as to the ravages of wars, revolutions and 
inflations that fatally afflicted their continent and abolished (or destroyed faith in) their 
originally more developed national equity culture.
123 It was later a short step for those 
with faulty memories to reconstruct the financial and business past to match the capital 
market present. Some historians, lawyers and economists even persuaded themselves that 
the US had invented this aspect of modern capitalism; or that Anglo-Saxon common   38
lawyers, triumphing over the inflexible, continental, Franco-Roman model, had done 
so.
124 Meanwhile, for some continentals, the equity culture of stock exchanges and 
widespread share ownership, a culture they had actually pioneered, was reconstructed as 
an Anglo-Saxon plot to subvert their social order.
125 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
The stereotypes of some received literature, about family firms, professional management 
and modernity, are not only empirically unreliable, but imply relationships with 
performance variables that are quite unconvincing.
126 The diversity of national 
institutional forms and corporate development paths revealed by the alternative 
perspectives described here offers a richer palette of variation for historical analysis of 
financial markets. This is not a convergent world smoothly evolving towards the end of 
history, in which one ideal model of ownership and corporate governance is pioneered in 
one country, soon revealed as unequivocally superior, and adopted with acclaim by 
successful followers. Metaphors of divorce, which imply a decisive transition to a 
preferred state, also seem rather inappropriate: whatever happened to relations between 
owners and managers was rather a slow and equivocal evolution. It was also a road 
apparently strewn with path dependencies, punctuated equilibria and possible wrong 
turnings. For example, contests for corporate control were common in widely-held US 
(and, more rarely, in European and Japanese) corporations at the beginning of the century, 
but were then suppressed everywhere for decades, before reappearing, in slightly 
modified form, in Britain in the 1950s and the US in the 1960s. Countries that pioneered 
widespread shareholding and the separation of ownership from control, like France and   39
Japan, later re-appear as exponents of the noyau dur or keiretsu of strong shareholder 
control and corporate interlinks.  
  Any simple equation of any of these institutional mutations with efficient 
corporate management or with desirably fluid (or, according to taste, desirably committed 
and stable) capital markets is naïve.
127 The picture is rather one of unseeing, market-
driven, but convention-constrained, experimentation, and of evolving routines of trust, 
reciprocity and quality certification which sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. There 
were also stochastic shocks of war, occupation, revolution or inflation that lurched into 
reverse financial systems that previously appeared to be working passably well. The 
differently structured national financial and corporate systems that emerged had 
weaknesses as well as advantages. The results, in terms of outcomes for growth, or for 
the intermediation of corporate capital demands and investor portfolio opportunities, 
depended not only on the degree of divorce of control from ownership (and closely 
related issues such as the existence of a market for corporate control), but on evolving 
informational requirements for public companies, changing leverage ratios and their 
incentive effects, antitrust and securities laws, the governance of relationships with other 
stakeholders, and wider characteristics of the corporate environment, like the change 
from quasi-monopolized, regulated (and mainly national) railway and other utilities as the 
dominant corporate form at the beginning of the twentieth century to the (mainly globally 
competitive) industrial and service corporations of today. This article raises more 
questions than it answers, but I hope it establishes the need to develop a different, and 
richer, model than that presented in much of the recent literature, if we are to make   40
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